Labor Law—Rights and Duties of Successor Unions—General Dynamics Corp. by Leahy, Edward R
Boston College Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 6
6-1-1970
Labor Law—Rights and Duties of Successor
Unions—General Dynamics Corp.
Edward R. Leahy
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward R. Leahy, Labor Law—Rights and Duties of Successor Unions—General Dynamics Corp., 11
B.C.L. Rev. 1006 (1970), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol11/iss5/6
CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Rights and Duties of Successor Unions—General
Dynamics Corp.'—General Dynamics Corporation and the Engi-
neers and Architects Association (EAA), which was certified by
the National Labor Relations Board in 1963, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement effective from November, 1965 to December,
1970. Prior to the end of the third year of the agreement, the Team-
sters Union filed a representation petition in an attempt to displace the
EAA as the employee representative. The Teamsters' counsel and the
Board of Governors of EAA had held previous meetings at which the
EAA indicated that they wanted to affiliate with the Teamsters. The
Teamsters rejected affiliation with the EAA, stating that it was not
interested in any contract other than the one it alone would negotiate,
and began an organization campaign.
The Board found that the filing of the petition by the Teamsters
was timely, since it was filed during the 60 to 90 day period preceding
the third anniversary of the signing of the EAA contract,' and that an
election was not prevented by the three-year contract-bar rule, which
prohibited elections during the first three years of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Board ruled that a question affecting commerce
existed within the meaning of Sections 9(c) (1) 3, 2(6) and 2(7) 4 of
the National Labor Relations Act and ordered the election.' The
Teamsters' election campaign centered on the promise that they, unlike
the EAA, would not be bound by the existing agreement but would
nullify it and negotiate a new agreement containing better wages and
benefits. The foregoing promise, coupled with the fact that the leader-
ship of the incumbent EAA aided the Teamsters' campaign for a
change in representation, resulted in an election victory for the
Teamsters. General Dyamics objected to the election results on the
basis of the Teamsters' campaign promise that they would abrogate the
existing collective bargaining agreement and negotiate a better one.
The Regional Director overruled this objection on the ground that the
Teamsters' representation of its ability to void the agreement was
proper, as it was not bound thereby. General Dynamics has petitioned
the Board for a review of the Regional Director's ruling"
1 General Dynamics Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (1969).
2 Representation petitions are timely when filed not less than 60, nor more than 90
days before the terminal date of an existing bargaining agreement. Leonard Wholesale
Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962).
s National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as N.L.R.A.] § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1) (1964).
4 N.L.R.A. § 2(6)-(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6)-(7) (1964). The Act defines "affecting
commerce" as burdening the free flow of commerce, or tending to lead to a labor dispute
obstructing commerce. Commerce is defined as the trade, traffic or communication among
the states, or between a state or foreign country, territory, or District of Columbia.
5 General Dynamics Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (1969).
Not reported in Board decisions.
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The Board is faced with a previously undecided issue by this ap-
peal. It must determine whether a union, granted an election petition
by the Board after the contract-bar period expires, may campaign for
election on the basis of its ability to void the bargaining agreement.
Thus the Board must determine whether a successor union may void
a collective bargaining agreement after the three-year contract-bar
period has expired. It is submitted that for the same policy reasons
underlying the contract-bar doctrine, the Board should in this situation
decide that the successfully challenging union may negotiate a new
contract, thus making contracts for more than three years voidable by
a certified successor union. This casenote will examine this solution
to the successor union problem on the basis of the Supreme Court's
guidelines for successor employers and the Board's contract-bar
doctrine.
The National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) 7 grants to em-
ployees the right to organize and bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing.' The representatives selected by a
majority of the employees in a unit constitute the "exclusive represen-
tatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining . . . ."° The Act further allows, however, a group of
employees or a labor organization acting in their behalf to file a
petition alleging that a substantial number of employees no longer
desire to be represented by the labor organization currently recog-
nized by the employer as their collective bargaining agent?" After
a hearing, if the N.L.R.B. finds that a question of representation
affecting commerce exists, it will generally direct an election and
certify the results thereof.' After being certified, the new representa-
tive can enter into contract negotiations with the employer who, if he
refuses to bargain collectively with the new representative of his
employees, commits an unfair labor practice?'
The Board's enunciation of a series of rules known as the con-
tract-bar doctrine, however, makes the employer's position under this
mandate to bargain uncertain in situations where a valid collective
bargaining agreement exists, but a new union is certified. The contract-
bar doctrine defines those circumstances under which an existing
agreement between management and employees will prevent a rival
union from filing an election petition in an attempt to gain recognition
as the lawful representative of the employees. Fixed-term contracts of
up to three years will bar an election for their entire period under the
contract-bar doctrine. Longer fixed-term contracts will preclude an
election only for the initial three years." The Board has never decided
N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
8 N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
9 N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
10 N.L.R.A. § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
11 Id.
12 N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
13 General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
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the effect of the certification of a new union after the expiration of the
three-year contract-bar period on the continuing validity of an existing
labor agreement for a fixed period of more than three years negotiated
by a predecessor union.
The Board and courts have, however, considered the issue of the
effect of a collective bargaining agreement on a successor employer.
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston," the Supreme Court held
that once a corporate employer enters into a collective bargaining
agreement with a union, the employer's disappearance by merger
"does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered
by the agreement, and that ... the successor employer may be required
to arbitrate with the union under the agreement."5 Since Wiley has
been much discussed," only those portions of that decision relating to
the successor union problem will be analysed. In Wiley, Interscience
Publishers, Inc. negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union. The contract did not
contain an express provision making it binding on the successors of
Interscience. Interscience merged with the larger publishing firm of
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. None of Wiley's employees were represented
by a union, and it refused to bargain with the Retailers Union contend-
ing that the merger had completely terminated the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Rather than derogate from " [t]he federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration,"" however, the Court found that
Wiley had indeed inherited, and was bound by, at least the arbitration
clause of the agreement it did not sign. Thus Wiley was required to
arbitrate matters typically covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments such as seniority status, severance pay, and pension fund pay-
ments.
After the Wiley decision some courts attempted to extend this
ruling to encompass terms contained in the agreement other than the
arbitration clause, and in some cases courts have indicated that the
successor employer should inherit the complete collective bargaining
agreement. In Wackenhut Corp. V. Union Plant Guard Workers,'8 two
unions brought an action to enforce the arbitration provision of a labor
agreement which had been entered into by General Plant Protection
Co., whose business and assets Wackenhut purchased without expressly
assuming General Plant's existing labor agreements. The court applied
what it interpreted to be the Wiley rule, and held that where a
14 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
15 Id. at, 548. The Court went on to state that arbitration would be required when
there was substantial continuity of identity of the business enterprise. Id. at 551.
16 See Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 735 (1969); Note, The Duties of Successor Employers Under John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston and Its Progeny, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 498 (1968); Note, The Contractual Obli-
gations of a Successor Employer Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Prede-
cessor, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 914 (1965).
17 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
18 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
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substantial continuity of identity is found before and after the change
of ownership of a business, a collective bargaining agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause negotiated by the predecessor employer
is completely binding on his successor?
A similar extension occurred in United Steelworkers v. Reliance
Universal, Inc." There, the respondent purchased a concrete pipe
manufacturing plant from Martin Marietta in 1963. Petitioner had an
exclusive bargaining agreement with Martin Marietta "to continue in
effect until Midnight, July 21, 1964." The purchase and sale agreement
attempted to exclude this collective bargaining agreement from the
purchase. When Reliance refused to honor the agreement, the union
struck the plant and sought a declaratory judgement under Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Ace' for a ruling that the agree-
ment was binding on Reliance and for an order directing arbitration
of alleged violations of that agreement. After finding that plant oper-
ations continued substantially unchanged, the court interpreted Wiley
as requiring inheritance of the complete agreement: "The 1962
collective bargaining agreement, as embodiment of the law of the shop,
remained the basic charter of labor relations at the ... plant after the
change of ownership." 22
On the basis of these decisions, the NLRB in General Dynamics
could reason that an employer's inheritance of its predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement is analogous to a superseding union's
inheritance of its predecessor's agreement. If so, the Board may, on
the theory of mutuality of obligations, reason that a succeeding union's
rights and obligations should be consistent with those of the succeed-
ing employer, and hold that the new union is bound under the prede-
cessor's agreement. That is, the court must determine whether the
Wiley rationale that a duty to arbitrate is not obviated by a change
in the corporate structure of a business enterprise23 should be applied
to bind a union which becomes the bargaining agent of an identical
group of employees during the term of an agreement between the
former employee representative and the employer.
If the merger of two unions is the voluntary act of both, and the
replacement of a defunct union is the voluntary act of the successor
union, consistent with the decisions in Wiley, Wackenhut and Re-
liance, the successor union in these instances should inherit its
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Two cases dealing with
10 Id. at 958.
20 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir. 1964).
21 29 U.S.C. 	 185 (1964).
22 335 F.2d at 895. The court, however, limited the applicability of the old contract
by noting that "the arbitrator may find that equities inherent in changed circumstances
require an award in a particular controversy at variance with some term or terms of that
contract." Id. Contra, Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Assn,
393 F.2d 407, 410 n.3 (1st Cir. 1968), suggesting that the extension of Wiley in Reliance,
which applied the whole agreement to the successor employer, was unwarranted:
22 376 U.S. at 549-51.
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predecessor unions provide authority to this effect. In a representation
election the employees of Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation
selected, and the NLRB certified, the United Gas, Coke and Chemical
Workers as their exclusive bargaining agent. One month later, after
the Gas workers had merged with another union to become the Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW), the employer refused to
bargain with them on the ground that the Board's determination of
the bargaining unit was erroneous. The court in Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. NLRB" affirmed the Board's conclusion that
"OCAW, as the consolidated organization and a continuance of the
Gas Workers, has succeeded to the status of that organization as the
duly designated bargaining representative of the Respondent's em-
ployees . . . and that the same duty devolves upon the Respondent
to bargain collectively with OCAW. . . .""
A similar result was reached in Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v.
NLRB." There, after being certified, various United Fresh Fruit and
Vegetable Grower locals changed their status from a union chartered
by the National CIO, to a union chartered by the United Packinghouse
Workers. The petitioner refused to bargain with the Packinghouse
local, claiming that it was a different union from the originally se-
lected bargaining agent. The court held the new union to be essen-
tially a continuation of the old, and since it was not substantially
different from the Fruit and Vegetable Union, the employer was ob-
liged to bargain collectively with the successor union under the terms
of the original certification." Thus, it may be concluded that if the
successor union inherits the rights of the originally certified union to •
bargain collectively with the employer, it should also succeed to any
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its predecessors.
When, however, an incumbent union is a party to a collective
bargaining agreement having a fixed duration of greater than three
years and is involuntarily ousted by a rival union, the analogy of
voluntary accession to the burdens and benefits of the collective bar-
gaining agreement does not apply. In this situation the successor
union should not be inhibited in its representative capacity by the
agreement which the employees repudiated through the representa-
tion election. Thus, if the Teamsters election victory can be termed
an involuntary ouster of EAA, then the collective bargaining agree-
ment should be voidable.
The Board examined the nature of the relationship between the
Teamsters and EAA prior to ordering the election, and decided that
the Teamsters was a rival union and not a "fronting legal successor"
to EAA." The Board relied on the fact that the Teamsters is a large
24 244 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957).
2ts H. at 673.
26 240 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1957).
27 Id. at 557.
28 General Dynamics Corp., 174 N.L.R.E. No. 154 (1969).
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national union, and that it had expressly rejected any affiliation re-
quests by EAA. Furthermore, since EAA maintained its own offices,
paid its own expenses from its dues, and processed its own grievances,
it could not be considered a defunct union or a facade for the Team-
sters. Although eleven of the thirteen members of the Teamsters
Organizing Committee at General Dynamics were officers or represen-
tatives of EAA, the Board determined that an election should be
ordered since the Teamsters could not be considered a "straw" union
or a facade for EAA's attempt to change wages, hours and conditions
of employment."
It is submitted that in General Dynamics, the new representative
should not be bound by the existing agreement for the remainder of
its term. Rather, the certification of the new union should terminate
the agreement because, unlike the employer in Wiley, the new union
did not assume the rights and duties of the old union with respect
to the agreement. The Teamsters campaign and election were neces-
sarily based on dissatisfaction with the existing agreement. The con-
flict between the new bargaining agent and the former representative
dispels any theory of voluntary successorship." Nor would the newly
certified union succeed to the collective bargaining agreement if the
pact stated that it bound "successors and assigns." Not only is there
no true successorship, but neither is there a valid common law assign-
ment of the rights and obligations of the contract since there is no
acceptance of the agreement by the unconsenting successor. Unlike
the successor employer cases noted above, the new union did not merge
with a portion of the old union or utilize some of the components or
facilities of the previous union. Thus, no true analogy exists between
a successor employer and a successor union in the General Dynamics
situation, since the former involves an envelopment and continuance
of the old corporation, while the latter represents a complete break
with the previous union.
The rationale that the Teamsters should not be bound by the
existing agreement is also supported by an examination of the contract-
bar doctrine, because the new union is the result of an exercise by the
employees of the right of reprieve afforded by the doctrine. The pur-
pose of the contract-bar doctrine is to present an opportunity for the
termination, not inheritance, of the old agreement. The Board has,
however, interpreted the doctrine so as to avoid frequent terminations of
collective bargaining agreements by the contracting parties. In Mont-
gomery Ward & Co.,' an employer who was a party to a five-year con-
tract with a union, petitioned after three years for a representation
election for a unit of employees. When the Board issued a Decision and
Direction of Election, the incumbent union petitioned the Board to
20 Id.
BO petrowitz, The Effect of a Change of a Bargaining Representative, 10 Lab. L.J.
845, 858 (1959).
81 137 N.L.R.B. 346 (1962).
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reconsider its decision. The Board granted the petition for reconsidera-
tion and held: "where ... the incumbent union is the certified bargain-
ing representative, a current contract should constitute a bar to a
petition by either of the contracting parties during the entire term of
that contract!"32 [Emphasis added.] Thus the Board limited the
application of the contract-bar doctrine to situations where a consent-
ing union is seeking certification. By adopting this procedure the
Board avoided the injustice which would have resulted had it inter-
preted its contract-bar rules as allowing employers or unions to take
advantage of the benefits accruing under the contract while avoiding
their contractual obligations by petitioning the Board for an election
following the initial three years of the agreement." The Montgomery
Ward rule, as necessarily applied in the Teamsters' petition for
election, assures that the Teamsters and EAA were not collaborating
to undermine the purpose of the contract-bar doctrine.
The NLRB's formulation of the contract-bar doctrine reflects its
recognition of the necessity for a balance between the frequently
conflicting right of employees to select a bargaining representative at
reasonable intervals, and a sustained adherence to that bargaining
agent once chosen. The most recent enunciation of the contract-bar
rules came in General Cable Corp.,' where the Board held that
"[c]ontracts of definite duration for terms up to three years will bar
an election for their entire period; contracts having longer fixed terms
will be treated for bar purposes as 3-year agreements and will pre-
clude an election for only their initial 3 years!"35
The general purpose of the contract-bar doctrine is to protect the
employees' exercise of the freedom to organize and designate represen-
tatives to bargain collectively with the employer. At the same time
the doctrine helps to insure the stability of labor contracts so that the
employer may establish production quotas and fixed-price contracts,
and budget his costs. The bar also prevents employees and labor
organizations from "[d]isrupting normal contractual relations by seek-
ing frequent representation elections . . . ."" Furthermore, by insur-
ing predictable intervals when representation petitions may be filed,
an uninterrupted three-year period of stability is afforded the manage-
32 Id. at 347.
88 Id. at 348-9.
84 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
35 Id. at 1125. The present 3-year rule has evolved from earlier Board decisions.
In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 8 N.L.R.B. 508 (1938), the Board ordered an elec-
tion after 1 year of a 5-year contract, holding that a contract which had been in
effect for more than 1 year could not foreclose an election. In 1947 the Board decided
that the stability of industrial relations outweighed the right of employees to change
their representation and adopted a 2-year contract-bar rule whereby a 2-year col-
lective bargaining agreement would foreclose a representation election until just prior to
its termination. Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927, 930 (1947). See also Association
of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 992 (1958).
36 Petrowitz, supra note 30, at 847.
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ment-labor relationship, while at the same time a reasonable oppor-
tunity is provided the employee to reappraise his bargaining agent.
Since the doctrine tends to reduce employer and employee dissatis-
faction, "industrial strife and unrest" are avoided commensurate with
national labor policy."
An examination of the interrelationship between the contract-bar
rationale and the Board's decision in American Seating Co." suggests
a solution regarding the effect of a successor union's certification after
the third year of a five-year contract negotiated by the superseded
union. In American Seating the petitioner-employer executed a three-
year collective bargaining agreement with the United Auto Workers
(UAW) covering all employees in the certified unit. Just prior to the
expiration of the initial two years of the agreement, The Pattern
Makers Union sought to sever a craft unit of patternmakers from the
UAW. The Board directed an election, holding that the UAW con-
tract was not a bar because under the contract-bar doctrine then in
effect the requisite bar period was two years. The Pattern Makers
won the election and Board certification followed. The employer
refused to consider a collective bargaining agreement submitted by
the Pattern Makers, stating that it recognized the new union as the
bargaining representative for the pattern makers, but that the existing
contract with the UAW was binding on all employees until its July,
1953 expiration date. In evaluating the effect of a new union's election
and certification on the collective bargaining agreement of its predeces-
sor, the Board held:
[F]or the reasons which led the Board to adopt the rule that
a contract of unreasonable duration is not a bar to a new
determination of representatives, such a contract may not
bar full statutory collective bargaining, including the reduc-
tion to writing of any agreement reached, as to any group of
employees in an appropriate unit covered by such contract,
upon the certification of a new collective-bargaining represen-
tative for them." [Emphasis added.]
The Board rejected the employer's contentions that the certifica-
tion of the new union merely resulted in the substitution of a new
bargaining agent and that the employees were bound to the substantive
provisions of the existing contracts since the acquisition of a new
agent does not revoke the acts of a previous agent. The Board stated
that common law rules of agency were not applicable since the em-
ployee-union relationship is "unique" under the NLRA. The Board
further noted the futility of directing an election if the new bargain-
32 	 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
38 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953).
89 Id. at 255.
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ing agent is powerless to fulfill his duties of negotiation for the re-
mainder of the term of the existing agreement."
The ruling in American Seating should be applied in the General
Dynamics situation. Since the unions in both cases complied with the
requirements of the contract-bar doctrine prior to their election, they
were certified by the Board as representatives of a unit of employees.
As the designated bargaining agent, their duty was to negotiate wages,
hours and other conditions of employment for the employees." Al-
though American Seating involved a craft severance, this is not a
material distinction since both cases involved the Board-sanctioned
electoral choice of a new bargaining agent. Thus, compliance with
the contract-bar doctrine should make the remaining term of any
existing agreement voidable.
The Fender Musical Instruments' ruling supports the theory
that the contract is voidable by the successor union. In Fender the
employer and union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which was to terminate on April 13, 1968. A new union was certified
on April 1, 1968. On April 5, pursuant to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by the old union, the employer
deducted the April union dues for the decertified union from all em-
ployees who had executed check-off authorizations. The decertified
union demanded that the employer remit these dues to it. The union
contended that by deducting the dues after the election and certifi-
cation of a new union the employer discriminated against the em-
ployees in violation of section 8(a)(3)," and interfered with the
section 7 rights of its employees in violation of section 8(a)(1)."
The Board dismissed the union's complaint, ruling that although the
union had been supplanted as exclusive bargaining representative by
a new union, the employer was required to continue the check-off
of dues to the succeeded organization until the expiration of the
agreement."
This is not a withdrawal from the American Seating doctrine.
In Fender the check-off dues in issue were deducted only during the
last two weeks before the legal termination of the agreement. During
these two weeks subsequent to the election, the newly certified union
did not have time to utilize its negotiating machinery, nor did it
challenge the unexpired term of the ruling pact. In fact, in dismissing
the complaint, the Board, citing American Seating, stated: "Our
decision herein in no way affects the right of the newly selected rep-
resentative to bargain for new terms and conditions of employment;
40 Id.
41 N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
42 175 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1969).
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964). The union further urged that this dues collection
violated § 8(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2), by constituting unlawful assistance and support
to the newly certified union.
44 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
45 175 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1969).
1014
CASE NOTES
nor does it relieve the employer of the duty so to bargain!" 48
 The
result in Fender, therefore, supports the contention that the existing
agreement is voidable upon the certification of the new bargaining
agent.
Allowing a successor union to void the agreement is consistent
with the policy considerations underlying the contract-bar doctrine.
While under the NLRA the parties to a labor agreement may contract
for a termination date of their own choosing, this freedom is tem-
pered by the contract-bar doctrine which has been "written into the
statute."" Thus, while the Board cannot terminate a collective bar-
gaining agreement under the NLRA, it has enunciated the doctrine
to prevent existing agreements from impeding full exercise of the
employees' statutory bargaining rights. The employees' selection of a
new union usually indicates dissatisfaction with the agreement nego-
tiated by their prior representative. Having selected a new repre-
sentative, and having been bound by the original agreement for a
reasonable time, the remainder of its term should be voidable at the
discretion of the newly designated union.
The projected ruling of the Board in General Dynamics Corp.
would permit a union to void the collective bargaining agreement of
its predecessor only after the Board allows a new election and the
incumbent union is defeated. As a result of the contract-bar doctrine,
a balance is achieved between the right of labor to reappraise their
representatives at reasonable intervals, and the right of management
to function for a reasonable time under a stable bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, the rule of Montgomery Ward prevents the contracting
parties from petitioning for a new election less than 60 or more than 90
days before the termination of the agreement. Thus, a union cannot
merely change its name, or use a "straw" union as successor to avoid
its contractual obligations.
If the successor union desires to negotiate a new agreement, the
general provisions of the old agreement regarding wages, hours and
conditions of employment would, consistent with Fender, be effective
until the new agreement is executed. Until the effective date of the
new agreement, the successor union would assume the responsibility
for the administration and enforcement of the previous agreement.
Allowing the Teamsters to void the agreement is the only proper
result in General Dynamics. The contract-bar doctrine was established
to prevent contracts of unreasonable duration from interfering with
employee rights. Once the Board has directed and certified an elec-
tion, shackling the new representative with its predecessor's agreement
would undermine the purpose of the contract-bar doctrine.
EDWARD R. LEAHY
46 Id.
47 Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 724 (2d Cir. 1949).
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